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is suggested that the Court of Appeals reconsider this unnecessary
impediment to the vindication of public employees' civil rights.
Kevin M. Berry
DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK LAW
Physician-patient privilege prevents disclosure of patient's iden-
tity to grand jury homicide investigation
In 1828, New York became the first state to recognize a physi-
cian-patient privilege,"3 8 thus protecting all information and confi-
dences regarding medical treatment and diagnosis. 13 Notwith-
138 See 5 WK&M 4504.01, at 45-175 (1982). The statute of 1828 read as follows:
No person duly authorized to practice physic or surgery, shall be allowed to dis-
close any information which he may have acquired in attending any patient, in a
professional character, and which information was necessary to enable him to pre-
scribe for such patient as a physician, or to do any act for him, as a surgeon.
Id. (quoting N.Y. REv. STAT. 1828, 406 (pt. 3, ch. 7, tit. 3, art. 8, § 73)).
At common law, the prerequisites to the creation of a privilege were, inter alia, that the
communication originated in an understanding of confidentiality, and that such confidenti-
ality was essential in maintaining the relationship of the parties. 8 J. WIGMORE, EvmENCE §
2285, at 531 (3d ed. 1940). For example, the communications between an attorney and client
have received protection since the sixteenth century, making it the oldest of the privileged
communications. Id. § 2290 at 547. Another common-law privilege, the spousal privilege,
proscribes the testimony of the spouse of a party to an action. See RICIHARDSON ON EVIDENCE
§ 445, at 437 (J. Prince 10th ed. 1973). Although the physician often was the recipient of his
patient's confidences, no such privilege existed at common law for doctors. See 8 J. WIG-
MORE, supra, § 2380, at 802. Early English law indicated that neither a voluntary vow of
secrecy nor the privacy of the relation alone were sufficient to establish a privileged commu-
nication. See C. DEWrrr, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT 10-
12 (1958). In the 1776 trial of the Duchess of Kingston, Lord Mansfield ruled that a physi-
cian was bound to reveal a patient's secrets and "'ha[d] no privilege, where it is a material
question, in a civil or a criminal case .... '" Id. at 11-12 (quoting Duchess of Kingston's
Trial, 20 How. St. Tr. 355 (1776)).
Although disclosures to a physician were not protected under the common law, the ethi-
cal principles of the medical profession, like those of the legal profession, compelled nondis-
closure of the patient's confidences. See C. DEWrrr, supra, at 22-23. The source of this
ethical consideration is the Hippocratic Oath, which includes the following- "Whatever, in
connection with my professional practice or not in connection with it, I see or hear, in the
life of men, which ought not to be spoken of abroad, I will not divulge, as reckoning that all
such should be kept secret." E. HAYT, L. HAYT & A. GROEscHEL, LAW OF HosPrrAL, PHYsi-
CIAN, AND PATIENT 637 (1952); see Note, Legal Protection of the Confidential Nature of the
Physician-Patient Relationship, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 383, 383 (1952).
"39 See CPLR 4504(a) (1963 & Supp. 1983). Generally, four prerequisites must be es-
tablished by the person invoking the physician-patient privilege before it can be used to
prevent disclosure: 1) the physician was authorized to practice medicine or is a professional
falling within the statutory guidelines; 2) the information was necessary for treatment; 3)
the information was acquired as a result of the physician-patient relationship; and 4) the
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standing the existence of the privilege, however, a physician still
may be required to disclose information if either the patient has
waived the privilege, 140 or the situation is covered by one of the
disclosure involved either "information" or a confidential "communication." Note, supra
note 138, at 390; see 5 WK&M 4504.04, at 45-187. The test for confidentiality was enumer-
ated in People v. Decina, 2 N.Y.2d 133, 145, 138 N.E.2d 799, 807, 157 N.Y.S.2d 558, 569
(1956), as "whether in the light of all the surrounding circumstances, and particularly the
occasion for the presence of the third person, the communication was intended to be confi-
dential. . . ." Id.
"Information" has been defined as "not only communications received from the lips of
the patient but such knowledge as may be acquired from the patient himself, from the state-
ment of others who may surround him at the time, or from observation of his appearance
and symptoms." Edington v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 67 N.Y. 185, 194 (1876). It has also been
held that the privilege extends to information of the patient's mental or physical condition
acquired by the physician even when the treatment was for an unrelated condition. See, e.g.,
In re Coddington's Will, 307 N.Y. 181, 188, 120 N.E.2d 777, 786 (1954) (information ac-
quired of testatrix's mental condition during treatment for unrelated physical malady held
privileged); People v. Eckert, 208 Misc. 93, 101-02, 142 N.Y.S.2d 657, 666 (Nassau County
Ct. 1955), modified, 1 App. Div. 2d 903, 149 N.Y.S.2d 644 (2d Dep't), af'd, 2 N.Y.2d 126,
138 N.E.2d 794, 157 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1956) (patient's admission to physician of knowledge
that his driving was impaired due to medical condition held privileged); see Massachusetts
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brei, 311 F.2d 463, 469 (2d Cir. 1962) (general practitioner's testimony
concerning patient's state of mind held inadmissible although physician only treated patient
for varicose ulcer); 5 WK&M 1 4504.08, at 45-196 to -97 (requirement that information held
by doctor must be necessary for his operating in professional capacity liberally applied by
courts in general).
In accordance with the statute's purpose to provide assurances to the patient that his
procurement of medical attention will not result in adverse disclosures, subsequent amend-
ments have extended the privilege to include dentists and nurses as well. See CPLR 4504(a)
(1963 & Supp. 1983). CPLR 4504(a) provides in relevant part:
(a) Confidential information privileged. Unless the patient waives the privi-
lege, a person authorized to practice medicine, registered professional nursing, li-
censed practical nursing or dentistry shall not be allowed to disclose any informa-
tion which he acquired in attending a patient in a professional capacity, and
which was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity. The relationship of a
physician and patient shall exist between a medical corporation .... a profes-
sional service corporation. . ., and the patients to whom they respectively render
professional medical services.
Id.
140 CPLR 4504(a) (1963 & Supp. 1983); see WK&M T 4504.09, at 45-204. "Although the
privilege is normally first asserted by the physician when called as a witness, it has always
been clear that it exists for the protection and benefit of the patient, who may abandon it."
WK&M 1 4504.09, at 45-205 (footnote omitted); see C. DnWrrr, supra note 138, at 46-47.
Because of the potential for misuse of the statute upon the death of a patient, see Renihan
v. Dennin, 103 N.Y. 573, 580, 9 N.E. 320, 322 (1886) (contestant of will prohibited from
introducing testimony of physician to prove incompetency of testator), many New York
courts held that the representatives of a patient may have authority to waive the privilege
on the patient's behalf, see, e.g., In re Frangeline's Will, 14 App. Div. 2d 420, 424-25, 222
N.Y.S.2d 39, 42 (4th Dep't 1961) (attorney capable of waiving the privilege on behalf of
decedent's brother); Kossar v. State, 13 Misc. 2d 941, 943, 179 N.Y.S.2d 71, 73 (Ct. Cl. 1958)
(waiver of privilege by patient's guardian permitted). In response, the legislature amended
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narrow exceptions to the privilege enumerated by statute.141 It has
been unclear whether information relating to the treatment of pa-
tients may be disclosed by a physician when a suspect's identity is
being sought in a criminal investigation. 142 Recently, in In re
Grand Jury Investigation of Onondaga County,14 3 the Court of
Appeals held that the identity of persons treated for knife wounds
the statute to include a provision allowing the personal representative, surviving spouse, or
next of kin to waive the decedent's privilege generally, and permitting any party in interest
to waive the privilege either when the validity of the will is in question or when the court
deems the interests of the personal representative adverse to those of the estate. CPLR
4504(c) (1963 & Supp. 1983); see WK&M 4504.19, at 45-227.
141 Distinct statutory exceptions to the physician-patient privilege involve circum-
stances where crimes have been committed against the patient. See CPLR 4504(b) (1963 &
Supp. 1983) (dental information must be disclosed for identification of patient); id. (infor-
mation must be disclosed that indicates patient under sixteen has been a crime victim). In
addition, section 265.25 of the New York Penal Law provides in part:
Every case of a bullet wound, gunshot wound, powder bum or any other in-
jury arising from or caused by the discharge of a gun or firearm, and every case of
a wound which is likely to or may result in death and is actually or apparently
inflicted by a knife, icepick or other sharp or pointed instrument, shall be re-
ported at once to the police authorities of the city, town or village where the per-
son reporting is located ....
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.25 (McKinney 1980). There have been no reported cases in which
section 265.25 of the Penal Law was directly involved. Id., commentary at 513.
Other exceptions to the physician-patient privilege recognized by the New York Legis-
lature involve issues of health. N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAw §§ 3372-3373 (McKinney 1977) (phy-
sician required to report the names of addicts or habitual users of narcotics under his treat-
ment); id. § 2101 (communicable diseases required to be reported). Child welfare has also
been deemed paramount to the physician-patient privilege. See Soc. SERv. LAW § 384-
b(3)(h) (McKinney 1983) (confidential communications not privileged in child custody pro-
ceeding); see also In re Three "John" Children, 61 Misc. 2d 347, 354, 306 N.Y.S.2d 797, 814-
15 (Family Ct. New York County 1969) (hospital records indicating mother was a heroin
addict admissible in custody proceeding seeking to remove mother's custody); People ex rel.
Chitty v. Fitzgerald, 40 Misc. 2d 966, 967, 244 N.Y.S.2d 441, 442 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1963) (medical records admissible in custody case where mental health of father in issue). In
addition, the physician-patient privilege is not applicable in child abuse proceedings. See
N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 1046(a)(vii) (McKinney 1983); In re Fred S., 66 Misc. 2d 683, 686, 322
N.Y.S.2d 170, 173 (Family Ct. Richmond County 1971) (prior medical history of child found
admissible in current child abuse case); In re Blaine, 54 Misc. 2d 248, 254, 282 N.Y.S.2d 359,
364 (Family Ct. Queens County 1967) (report of psychiatrist admissible in neglect proceed-
ing). Finally, an exception exists regarding the determination in a probate proceeding of the
mental state of a deceased. See CPLR 4504(c) (1963 & Supp. 1983) (physician required to
disclose information pertaining to mental or physical condition of deceased patient).
142 See In re Grand Jury Investigation of Onondaga County, 59 N.Y.2d 130, 133, 450
N.E.2d 678, 679, 463 N.Y.S.2d 758, 759 (1983). The lower court in Onondaga County viewed
the physician-patient privilege as being subject to the discretion of the court in situations
where the public interest in homicide investigations outweighed the policy considerations
underlying the privilege. Id. In contrast, other cases have upheld the privilege even where
the criminal investigation involved a homicide. See infra note 155.
143 59 N.Y.2d 130, 450 N.E.2d 678, 463 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1983).
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fell squarely within the proscriptions of the privilege and was not
subject to disclosure under a grand jury subpoena, since such dis-
closure would inherently reveal information relating to treatment
and diagnosis."'
In Onondaga County, the District Attorney for Onondaga
County had conducted an investigation into the stabbing death of
a woman. Since evidence obtained in that investigation indicated
that the victim may have stabbed her attacker, a grand jury sub-
poena was issued requesting the respondent hospital to produce
the medical records of all persons they treated for stab wounds
subsequent to the crime.145 The hospital moved to quash the sub-
poena, asserting the physician-patient privilege. 146 The county
court denied the motion, holding that the physician-patient privi-
lege must yield to a criminal investigation because of the greater
public interest in the latter.147
Pending the appeal, the District Attorney advised the hospital
that his request would be limited to the names and addresses of
persons treated for stab wounds. 48 The Appellate Division, Fourth
Department, reversed the lower court, holding that the subpoenaed
information necessarily would include the nature of the treatment
and, therefore, constituted privileged information.1 49 Additionally,
the court reasoned that any exception to the privilege should more
appropriately be created by the Legislature. 50
144 Id. at 136, 450 N.E.2d at 681, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 761.
145 Id. at 132-33, 450 N.E.2d at 679, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 759. On June 17, 1982, Onondaga
County District Attorney, Richard A. Hennessey, Jr., issued a Grand Jury subpoena for the
production of "any and all medical records pertaining to treatment of any person with stab
wounds or other wounds caused by a knife, from June 15, 1982 to the present time." Id. at
133, 450 N.E.2d at 679, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
146 Id. The hospital contended that the records sought were "information" which were
"acquired in attending a patient in a professional capacity, and which was necessary to en-
able [the physician] to act in that capacity." In re Grand Jury Investigation of Onondaga
County, 90 App. Div. 2d 990, 990, 456 N.Y.S.2d 586, 586 (4th Dep't 1982), af'd, 59 N.Y.2d
130, 450 N.E.2d 678, 463 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1983); see CPLR 4504(a) (1963 & Supp. 1983);
supra note 138 and accompanying text.
147 59 N.Y.2d at 133, 450 N.E.2d at 679, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 758. The county court did,
however, stay the enforcement of the subpoena while the hospital appealed. Id., 450 N.E.2d
at 679, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
148 Id.
149 90 App. Div. 2d at 990, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 586-87. The court responded to the District
Attorney's argument that the sought-after information merely related to the fact of treat-
ment by indicating that disclosure of the fact of treatment for a specific injury such as a
stab wound would automatically reveal the nature of treatment provided. Id.; see supra
notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
110 90 App. Div. 2d at 990, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 586-87.
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On appeal, the Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the
Appellate Division, 51 holding that the privilege was properly
raised by the hospital,15 and, thus, that the subpoena should be
quashed.153 The Court noted that this statutory privilege should be
interpreted broadly and "construed in accordance with its pur-
pose-'to encourage full disclosure by the patient so that he can
secure appropriate treatment from the physician.' "154 Addressing
the District Attorney's claim of an overriding public interest in a
homicide investigation, the Court reasoned that the physician-pa-
tient privilege already had been upheld where a patient-defendant
was accused of murder. 55 Furthermore, the Court observed that it
15, 59 N.Y.2d at 136, 450 N.E.2d at 681, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 761. Judge Meyer authored the
majority opinion in which Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Jasen, Jones, and Wachtler joined.
Judge Simons did not take part in the decision.
152 Id. at 135, 450 N.E.2d at 680, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 760. The Court conceded that the
privilege belonged exclusively to the patient, but noted that a physician or hospital may
assert the privilege to protect a patient who has not waived it. Id. The Court distinguished
this from a situation where a physician, hospital or other party tries to assert the privilege
to protect himself from prosecution for a crime committed against the patient. Id.; see also
In re Grand Jury Proceedings [Doe], 56 N.Y.2d 348, 351, 437 N.E.2d 1118, 1120, 452
N.Y.S.2d 361, 362 (1982) (hospital under grand jury investigation for crimes committed
against patients may not properly assert physician-patient privilege to defeat a subpoena of
hospital records); People v. Lay, 254 App. Div. 372, 373, 5 N.Y.S.2d 325, 326 (2d Dep't
1938), affd, 279 N.Y. 737, 18 N.E.2d 686 (1939) (criminal defendant may not raise the phy-
sician-patient privilege to exclude testimony of doctor who examined the alleged victim). In
such a case, the courts generally have recognized that permitting this type of assertion di-
rectly contradicts the original purposes of the privilege. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings
[Doe], 56 N.Y.2d at 353, 437 N.E.2d at 1120, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 363 ("purpose of the privilege
is to protect the patient, not to shield the criminal"); People v. Lay, 254 App. Div. at 373, 5
N.Y.S.2d at 326 (bullet wound exception "militates against a construction favorable to a
defendant in a criminal cause"); see supra note 139 and accompanying text.
153 59 N.Y.2d at 135, 450 N.E.2d at 679, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 759. The Court noted that
even though the District Attorney had limited the information sought under the subpoena
to the names and addresses of knife wound patients, see supra note 148 and accompanying
text, compliance with the demand would ultimately reveal "privileged information concern-
ing diagnosis and treatment ... " 59 N.Y.2d at 135, 450 N.E.2d at 680, 463 N.Y.S.2d at
760.
15 59 N.Y.2d at 134, 450 N.E.2d at 679, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 759 (citing In re Grand Jury
Proceedings [Doe], 56 N.Y.2d 348, 352, 437 N.E.2d 1118, 1120, 452 N.Y.S.2d 361, 363
(1982)). In determining that a broad construction of the privilege is necessary to implement
its policy, the Court relied on City Council v. Goldwater, 284 N.Y. 296, 300, 31 N.E.2d 31, 33
(1940) (physician-patient privilege is applicable in respect to a subpoena from an investiga-
tory committee as well as- court hearing), and People v. Decina, 2 N.Y.2d 133, 143, 138
N.E.2d 799, 805-06, 157 N.Y.S.2d 558, 568 (1956) (privilege not destroyed by presence of
third party at time communication made if the communication was intended to be
confidential).
-- 59 N.Y.2d at 135, 450 N.E.2d at 680, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 760. The Court observed that
the privilege was successfully invoked in two homicide cases which involved the treatment
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is the function of the Legislature to create exceptions to the privi-
lege. 156 Finally, the Court examined the existing exceptions, in par-
ticular the knife-wound exception, and concluded that "less serious
knife wounds are not within the mandate" of this or any excep-
tion. 57 In addition, the Court reasoned that since the Legislature
had seen fit to create such a narrow exception to CPLR 4504, a
public interest exception that would include the medical records of
patients treated for any knife wound would be overly broad. 5"
The Court's observation that exceptions to the physician-pa-
tient privilege are within the legislative domain is fundamentally
correct, since the legislature is the exponent of both the privilege
and its exceptionis. 159 Furthermore, case law reveals judicial intent
not to disturb the privilege. 160 Notwithstanding this, it is submit-
ted that the practical effect of the Court's decision to uphold the
privilege will foster the disturbing effect the privilege was designed
to guard against. Indeed, the District Attorney conceivably can cir-
cumvent the privilege by seeking the names and addresses of all
of the defendant-patient. Id. In People v. Decina, 2 N.Y.2d 133, 135, 138 N.E.2d 799, 800-01,
157 N.Y.S.2d 558, 560-61 (1956), the defendant suffered an epileptic occurrence while oper-
ating an automobile, lost control, and killed four persons. Id. The Court found that the
defendant's statements to the diagnosing doctor concerning his past medical history and his
present seizure were privileged under the theory that they aided the doctor to function in a
professional capacity. Id. at 143, 138 N.E.2d at 806, 157 N.Y.S.2d at 568. In People v. Mur-
phy, 101 N.Y. 147, 4 N.E. 326 (1886), the defendant was accused of performing an abortion.
Id. at 151, 4 N.E. at 327. The Court noted that the patient's statements to a subsequent
treating physician were privileged since disclosure would "cast discredit and disgrace upon
her." Id. at 150, 4 N.E. at 327.
1" 59 N.Y.2d at 135-36, 450 N.E.2d at 681, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 761.
157 Id. at 136, 450 N.E.2d at 681, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 761; see supra note 141 and accompa-
nying text.
"I See 59 N.Y.2d at 136, 450 N.E.2d at 681, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 761. Both the Appellate
Division and Court of Appeals mentioned Penal Law § 265.25 Id. Each court apparently
considered the knife wound exception as a possible basis for supporting the subpoena. See
59 N.Y.2d at 135-36, 450 N.E.2d at 679, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 759; 90 App. Div. 2d at 991, 456
N.Y.S.2d at 586.
19 See 59 N.Y.2d at 136, 450 N.E.2d at 681, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 761; supra notes 139 &
141. There have been a number of decisions that have followed the principle that any excep-
tions to a statutory prohibition should be "confined to the specific exception created by it."
In re Investigation, Kings County, 286 App. Div. 270, 274, 143 N.Y.S.2d 501, 507 (2d Dep't
1955) (hospital refused to disclose names of patients treated for abortions); see also In re
Coddington's Will, 307 N.Y. 181, 190, 120 N.E.2d 777, 786 (1954) (statute should be con-
strued only to permit disclosures obtained while not acting in a professional capacity). As
the Onondaga Court correctly indicated, the present exceptions to the physician-patient
privilege have all been codified by the legislature. See 59 N.Y.2d at 135-36, 450 N.E.2d at
680-81, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 760-61; see supra note 141 and accompanying text.
26oSee supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
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persons treated at the hospital since such information, absent ref-
erence to stab wounds, would not be privileged.161
It is submitted that an exception to the physician-patient
privilege is warranted when serious crimes, such as murder, are be-
ing investigated, and the District Attorney has specific knowledge
directing his investigation to the possible assailant. The present
exceptions to the physician-patient privilege were created in recog-
nition of social policy and in the interest of protecting public wel-
fare.16 2 Such considerations should dictate similar treatment of the
privilege in cases involving heinous crimes such as murder.
As protection against unreasonable intrusion upon the rights
of individuals by an overzealous law enforcement investigation, the
issuance of a grand jury subpoena is subject to court supervision,1 3
161 See In re Albert Lindley Lee Memorial Hasp., 115 F. Supp. 643, 645 (N.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 209 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub noma. Cincotta v. United States, 347 U.S. 960
(1953) (names and addresses of a physician's patients not privileged since fact of attendance
does not reveal nature of treatment). Although the nature of treatment historically has been
privileged under the statute, see, e.g., Edington v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 67 N.Y. 185, 194
(1876), the mere fact of treatment is not privileged, see Klein v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,
221 N.Y. 449, 453, 117 N.E. 942, 943 (1917) (fact that individual was the patient of a doctor,
was sick, and was treated is not privileged); E. HAYT, L. HAYT & A. GROESCHEL, supra note
138, at 644 (dates of hospitalization not privileged). Indeed, "facts which are 'plain to the
observation of anyone without expert or professional knowledge' are not within the privi-
lege." 59 N.Y.2d at 134, 450 N.E.2d at 680, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 760 (quoting Klein v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am., 221 N.Y. 449, 453, 117 N.E. 942, 943 (1917)). The Court thus acknowledged
that the statute would not be violated if photographs of patients were subpoenaed, or if the
names and addresses of the patients of a specific doctor were subpoenaed. 59 N.Y.2d at 134,
450 N.E.2d at 680, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 760. For the District Attorney to subpoena the names of
all patients treated, the mere showing of a legitimate reason and the absence of an intent to
harass would be sufficient since such information does not enjoy protection of the physician-
patient privilege.
162 See 59 N.Y.2d at 135, 450 N.E.2d at 680, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 760; supra note 156 and
accompanying text. The majority of exceptions deal with the disclosure of information rec-
ognized as paramount to the furtherance of the confidentiality of the physician-patient rela-
tionship. See supra note 140. These exceptions were brought about as a result of the early
criticisms of the privilege and its tendency to prohibit the introduction of relevant testi-
mony. Id.
16' See In re Seiffert, 446 F. Supp. 1153, 1155 (N.D.N.Y. 1978). "The Court has the
power to supervise the use of subpoenaes, by the grand jury, to gain testimony and evidence
in the course of investigations." Id. Judicial supervision is the by-product of both the prohi-
bition of unreasonable searches and seizures, United States v. Grand Jury Investigation, 417
F. Supp. 389, 391 (E.D. Pa. 1976), and the "court's inherent ability to supervise the use of
process to compel the presence of witnesses, and to oversee the grand jury which it em-
panels," In re Seiffert, 446 F. Supp. at 1155. The supervisory power of the court insures that
the disclosures requested under a subpoena are neither "unreasonab[le] nor oppressive."
United States v. Loskocinski, 403 F. Supp. 75, 77 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); see also Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43, 77 (1906) (necessity or materiality should be shown when requesting a large
quantity of documents). While the standard of reasonableness in every case has similar fac-
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
and must be reasonable both in its issuance and its scope by speci-
fying the requested objects of disclosure.1" In light of this protec-
tion, it is submitted that an exception to the physician-patient
privilege should be implemented through the use of a standard by
which the District Attorney must furnish evidence to indicate
probable cause 6 5 that the suspect would be seeking medical atten-
tion at the hospital. Since grand jury proceedings are inherently
secret, the privacy rights of patients other than the accused would
be protected, and thus, the disclosure of specific medical records
tors, "[e]ach case must be judged according to the peculiar facts arising from the sub-
poena. . . ... Loskocinski, 403 F. Supp. at 77 (quoting United States v. Medical Soc'y, D.C.,
26 F. Supp. 55, 57 (D.D.C. 1938)).
'I" See In re Rabbinical Seminary Netzach Israel Ramailis, 450 F. Supp. 1078, 1084
(E.D.N.Y. 1978). When a subpoena is challenged for its unreasonableness, a three-part test
has been utilized: "1) The documents requested must be shown to have some general rele-
vance to the subject matter of a legitimate grand jury investigation, 2) [t]he subpoena must
describe the materials to be produced with reasonable particularity, [and] 3) [t]he docu-
ments may not cover more than a reasonable period of time." Id.
"Relevance" has been easily met through a showing that the information "'may have
some possible connection' to the subject matter." Id. (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum, 391 F. Supp. 991, 997 (D.R.I. 1975)). The grand jury, however, need not es-
tablish the relevance of each individual document sought. 450 F. Supp. at 1084 n.4.
15 A requirement of probable cause for subpoenas would put them on par with search
warrants, which must meet a standard whereby the object and place of search is specifically
identified and probable cause is shown to exist. See, e.g., People v. Mangiovlino, 75 Misc. 2d
698, 701, 348 N.Y.S.2d 327, 332 (Monroe County Ct. 1973). The requirement of probable
cause was designed to eliminate "untrammeled discretion" and to protect privacy rights.
People v. Dolan, 95 Misc. 2d 470, 473, 408 N.Y.S.2d 249, 251 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1978);
see also People v. Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d 106, 111, 324 N.E.2d 872, 877, 365 N.Y.S.2d 509, 514
(1975). When examining the legality of a search, for example, "[w]hether or not a particular
search or seizure is to be considered reasonable requires weighing the government's interest
in the detection and apprehension of criminals against the encroachment involved with re-
spect to an individual's right to privacy and personal security." Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). The Mangioulino court underscored the distinction between "mere suspi-
cion and probable cause." 75 Misc. 2d at 701, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 332. To establish probable
cause, sufficient information is required to "reasonably justify the conclusion that certain
property... is located in particular premises." Id. The court further noted that where
probable cause is established, the need for information and its resulting benefits are bal-
anced against the invasion of privacy, and in a close situation, privacy must yield. Id.
Many cases have held that the standard of probable cause must be considered in view
of all surrounding facts and circumstances. See, e.g., People v. Dolan, 95 Misc. 2d 470, 473,
408 N.Y.S.2d 249, 251 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1978) (search without warrant was reasona-
ble under the circumstances where defendant was accused of criminally negligent homicide);
see People v. Kreichman, 37 N.Y.2d 693, 697, 339 N.E.2d 182, 186, 376 N.Y.S.2d 497, 502
(1975) (warrantless search of automobile reasonable under the circumstances). In addition,
the need for evidence must be balanced with the public's interest in preserving the confiden-
tial privilege. Id. 339 N.E.2d at 186, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 502. In the present case, the exigency
of the situation, the location of the hospitals in the area, and the nature of evidence that
suggested the suspect was injured are all factors to be considered.
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would not thwart the traditional policy considerations upon which
the physician-patient privilege is founded.le"
Mary Ellen Moran
V In People v. Doe, 107 Misc. 2d 605, 608, 435 N.Y.S.2d 656, 658 (Sup. Ct. Westches-
ter County 1981), which involved the subpoena of hospital records of a specific physician's
patients, the court balanced the purposes of disclosure against the "paramount right of the
Grand Jury to investigate allegations of possible criminal activity." Id. The court in Grand
Jury Proceedings [Doe], 56 N.Y.2d 348, 353, 437 N.E.2d 1118, 1120, 452 N.Y.S.2d 361, 363
(1982), while concluding that the purposes of the physician-patient privilege would not be
greatly affected by disclosure observed that "[tihe Grand Jury operates in secret, and the
prospect that it might examine the files of a hospital in connection with allegations of
crimes committed against the hospital's patients is unlikely to inhibit these patients from
making candid disclosures . . . ." Id.
The inherent secrecy of grand jury proceedings militates against the disclosure of the
identity of persons collaterally obtained through the use of a subpoena. See H. ROTHBLATr,
CRIMINAL LAW OF NEW YORK § 229, at 173 (1971). It is only after the indictment of the
accused, which is "based upon evidence which would, if unexplained or uncontradicted, war-
rant a conviction," that information pertaining only to the accused would be released. See
id. § 245, at 186-87. In the present case, the type of information revealed would simply be
the identity of a patient treated for knife wounds where other evidence was present to war-
rant conviction at trial if uncontradicted.
Before a subpoena may be issued, the court must establish the relevance of the re-
quested material to the investigation. In re Rabbinical Seminary Netzach Israel Ramailis,
450 F. Supp. 1078, 1084 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). In addition to its relevance, the requested material
must be specifically identified such that the request is not overbroad. Id. In the present
case, it is suggested that the District Attorney's request for the names of patients treated for
knife wounds was certainly relevant. Moreover, the subpoena was sufficiently tailored to
avoid overbreadth. 59 N.Y.2d at 133, 450 N.E.2d at 679, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 759. Finally, the
period of time covered by the request was very reasonable since it was not more than two
days. Id.
